The spacesuit assembly has a fascinating and complicated history dating back to the early 1930s. Much has been written on this history from an assembly perspective and, to a lesser extent, a component perspective. However, little has been written or preserved specifically on smaller, lesser-known aspects of pressure suit design. One example of this is the injection patch-a small 2-in.-diameter disk on the leg of the Apollo suit that facilitated a medical injection when pressurized, and the only known implementation of such a feature on a flight suit. Whereas many people are aware this feature existed, very little is known of its origin, design, and use, and the fact that the Apollo flight suit was not the only instance in which such a feature was implemented. This paper serves to tell the story of this seeming "afterthought" of a feature, as well as the design considerations heeded during the initial development of subsequent suits.
he earliest efforts in pressure suit design were driven by the need to survive high altitudes during attempts to break speed or height flight records. At first, these efforts were propelled by daredevil aviators such as Wiley Post; however, the most aggressive pressure suit development period arguably occurred between the early 1940s and the mid 1960s, beginning with parallel and often competing efforts funded by the US Air Force and the US Navy, and culminating in the design of the Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU).
Although differences abound between early flight suits and spacesuits used during the Mercury and Gemini programs, one common factor differentiates them from the Apollo suit: For Apollo, the ability to get back to the safety of Earth relatively quickly was precluded. The fact that Apollo represented a change from being able to get home within hours to not being able to get home for days drove the program to consider additional risks, and the requirements to address those risks.
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One no (Fig. 2 3 the injection patch was added on version A-1C-6 ( Fig. 3 ). Based on this information, Cathy Lewis at the Smithsonian Institute performed a comprehensive survey of the 15 David Clark A-1C suits in their possession. Of these, 11 suits were available for evaluation; of these, 10 suits had injection patches intact ( Fig. 4 ). Interestingly enough, although they were constructed and integrated similar to the ILC A7L injection patches (as illustrated in the next section), there are varying levels of integration. For example, compare the injection patches from A-1C serial number 114 to serial numbers 133 and 125.
Whereas serial numbers 114 and 125 were well integrated to the back side of the cover layer using different applications of loop tape, serial number 133 has exposed Link-Net and bladder. As this injection hardware was likely never designed to be tested, it is of little consequence as far as safety is concerned, but it does provide interesting insight into the varied construction methods that were tried across different assemblies within a relatively short period of time.
It should be mentioned that little else is known, with certainty, regarding these injection discs-e.g., what material they were made of, if they were tested, etc. However, it can be said with some confidence that other than the ILC design that flew for Apollo, the David Clark A-1C is the only other known pressure suit with a functional injection patch. 
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IV. Apollo Injection Hardware
Specific details on the engineering design of the Apollo medical injector are scarce. Engineering drawings, specifications, requirements, or internal pictures of the devices have not been found. Several of the injectors are on display at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in Washington D.C., but the internal structure of these injectors has not been examined. Pictures of the medical kit and the injectors are shown in Figs. 13 and 14 .
Several people who had first-hand experience of the Apollo design were contacted during the course of the search for information. Dr. Sam Pool joined NASA in 1969 and served as a flight surgeon during the Apollo Program. From his description, the injectors housed pre-filled medical syringes inside a pressurized aluminum tube. This tube was placed flush with the outside of the resraint layer, and was activiated by pressing a button at the top of the device. Once the button was depressed, a spring performed two actions. First, the syringe and needle were displaced, driving the needle through the seal on the device, through the injection patch in the EVA suit, and into the muscle on the upper thigh. The spring continued its action to depress the plunger on the syringe, delivering the medication into the muscle of the crewmember. The time from depressing the button on the injector to complete delivery of the medication was fast (less than 1 second) to prevent the crewmember being injected from reflexively pulling away before the injection was finished.
V. Post-Apollo Development
Likely due to the operational concept of the the Space Shuttle Program, the Shuttle EMU did not carry an injection patch; therefore, development of in-suit injection hardware languished for the better part of 4 decades. However, with the Constellation Program looking to enable a human lunar return came a renewed interest and the need to provide injection capability through the suit.
Most of the development during the Constellation suit project focused on risk and requirements definition. Looking at this work provides a microcosm of the different risk posture of the Constellation Program as compared to the Apollo Program. For example, one of the largest driving contingency scenarios defined in Constellation was the so-called "144-hour return" case, where a pressurized suit would need to protect its occupant from the lunar surface and all the way back to Earth during a contingency. In theory, this is no different from the Apollo risk; however, the Constellation Program set out to specifically protect for this scenario. Driving requirements included 144 hours of in-suit waste management, 144 hours of nutrition and hydration, and 144 hours of emergency medical care. Regarding the latter, Constellation Medical Operations identified a list of possible medical scenarios needing protection during this contingency return. Among the scenarios was the pushing of fluids in the event the crewmember became ill and was unable to maintain hydration using a feeding tube (Fig. 15 ). This quickly became an issue, as previous implementations of in-suit injection patches were meant for instramuscular (IM) injections. To push fluids, either an intravascular (IV) or intraosseal (IO) injection would be required. The former would likely need a permanently installed IV in the crewmember, something not considered practical or acceptable, especially for something meant to be used only in a contingency; the latter would require an injection directly into the bone-relatively difficult and painful as compared to an IM injection. On top of that, imposing IO injections limited the candidate injection sites to only a handful of locations. However, for a short time during development, IO injection was a requirement levied on the Constellation suit (along with the IM injection requirement).
In assessing the feasability of meeting the above requirements, engineers identified three candidate locations for the IO injection patch: the proximal tibial (knee), the distal tibial (ankle), and the proximal humerus (shoulder). However, none of these locations were attractive from a suit design perspective as they are all areas limited in real estate, taken up by important mobility elements. In the end, the IO injection requirement was removed, and a definite location was never identified.
Similarly, little development occurred on the IM injection patch before it was removed from the requirement set with a reduction in scope to an International Space Station-based mission. Plans were to leverage experience gained from the Apollo legacy design and perhaps update with new materials. Due to the flexibility of IM injection sites, no location was ever identified. However, for ease of pressurized use and the need for a crewmember to inject himself/herself as well as others, the injection site likely would have been placed on the thigh, similar to the Apollo design.
Prior to the removal of the injection requirements, limited work was completed to determine the most effective way of delivering liquid medication through the spacesuit to an injured or ill crewmember. Limited testing was completed on the suit side to determine what types of materials would work best to ensure an adaqate seal after injection. The main component of the Apollo-era injection patches was silcone, which is also the main component of medicinal vial caps. The project obtained different silcone materials in varying thicknesses and coatings. A needle was attached to a force gauge, and the septa material was punctured numerous times to evaluate the ingretity of the seal. Testing was performed on the benchtop in ambient conditions, in a vacuum environment, and in a cold chamber. After this testing, NASA concluded that the septum used for a suit interface should be either a fluorinated ethylene propylene (FEP [Teflon ® FEP] or an ethylene tetrafluoroethylene (ETFE [Tefzel ® ]) coated silicone septum with a thickness of 0.075" or greater.
In addition to testing of the septa materials, the team performed work to determine optimal parameters for the syringe. The design of an injection device for continegency space operations presents many challenges. Among them are how to maintain the temperature and pressure of the liquid medication without an operational environmental control and life support system. Also, with the crewmembers in their EVA suits during the contingency, what is the best form for the injector to take for ease of use. The EVA gloves inhibit dexterity and motion; in an emergency medical situation, the injector needs to be simple to operate. Testing was performed in a flight glove simulator to examine this parameter. The testing consisted of simulating operation of various forms and sizes of syringes to determine ease of operation while wearing pressurized EVA gloves. Using three different test operators, a 0.87-in.-diameter syringe was unanimously agreed upon to be the easiest syringe to operate with a gloved hand. This helped constrain the possible geometries for future injection devices. Figure 16 . Gloved assessment of syringes. Different syringes were manipulated with EVA gloves in a simulated pressure environment to determine how the geometry and size of a potential injection device affects a gloved operator's ability to provide an injection.
